We define a notion of realizability, based on a new assignment of formulas, which does not care for precise witnesses of existential statements, but only for bounds for them. The novel form of realizability supports a very general form of the FAN theorem, refutes Markov's principle but meshes well with some classical principles, including the lesser limited principle of omniscience and weak König's lemma. We discuss some applications, as well as some previous results in the literature.
Introduction
The realizability method, invented by Stephen Kleene in 1945 [8] , is a way of making explicit the constructive content of arithmetical sentences. It is closely related with intuitionistic logic, being reminiscent of the BrouwerHeyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of the intuitionistic logical words (see [15] for a modern overview of realizability). In particular, Kleene's realizability and related notions (e.g., modified realizability due to Kreisel in [13] ) decides disjunctions and provides precise witnesses for existential statements. In this paper, we shift attention from the constructive content of arithmetical sentences to the program of extracting bounding information from (semiintuitionistic) proofs in arithmetic. The emphasis on bounds is, by no means, a novel idea: Ulrich Kohlenbach has, for some years now, been urging a shift of attention to numerical bounds (cf. [12] for a recent statement).
Bounded modified realizability, as we call the novel realizability notion, is based on an analysis of formulas which always disregards precise existential witnesses and decisions concerning disjunctive statements. In this respect, it is different from the monotone realizability introduced by Kohlenbach in [10] , which is still a notion based on ordinary (modified) realizability. Our new form of realizability is inspired by work realized in [5] on a newly found functional interpretation (in the sense of Gödel [6] ), but it is simpler than it in one crucial aspect. The new functional interpretation relies on intensional majorizability relations, regulated by rules, instead of axioms (with the effect of inducing the failure of the deduction theorem). This feature is mandatory because it prevents the functional interpretation from analyzing bounded quantifications of non-zero type, thereby managing to treat them as computationally empty. However, in the case of realizability, this intensional move is unnecessary because the ordinary majorizability relation is already treated as computationally empty by the realizability interpretation. As a consequence, in the framework herein presented, there are no intensional notions and the deduction theorem does hold. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the underlying framework of the paper. The central result of the work is the Soundness Theorem of Section 3. In this section, we also prove a Characterization Theorem for the notion of bounded modified realizability and study the adjunction of some conspicuous principles to our theories. We extend our analysis to the arithmetical setting in the Section 4 and lay out a commented list of some extra principles that mesh well with the new notion of realizability.
General framework
Except for the absence of the intensional majorizability relations, we follow the general framework of [5] . Accordingly, we let L ω ≤ be a language in all finite types (based on a given ground type 0) with a distinguished binary relation symbol ≤ 0 (infixing between terms of type 0) and distinguished constants m of type 0 (0 0) and z of type 0 (the constant z is needed to ensure that each finite type is inhabited by at least one closed term). The theory IL ω ≤ is intuitionistic logic in all finite types (see [2] for the Hilbert-type deduction system that we use) with axioms stating that ≤ 0 is reflexive, transitive, and with the axioms Equality does not pose particular problems for habitual realizability notions, and it is usually defined extensionally. However, bounded modified realizability does not seem to realize full extensionality (although it does realize important cases of it; see 1 of Subsection 4.3). Due to this feature, we opt for a treatment of equality based on the minimal alternative described by Troelstra in the end of section 3.1 and the beginning of section 3.3 of [14] . In the minimal alternative, there is a symbol of equality for terms of type 0 only. Its axioms are
where φ is an atomic formula with a distinguished type 0 variable w. In order to characterize the behavior of the logical constants (combinators) Π and Σ, we must also add
where φ is a an atomic formula with a distinguished variable w, and x, y and z are variables of appropriate type.
In the language L ω ≤ we can define Bezem's strong majorizability relation ≤ * ρ for type ρ and state its main properties (cf. [3] ). The proofs are simple and well-known: see [5] for a recent reference. The relations are defined by induction on the types:
where the relation ≤ σ is the pointwise "less than or equal to" relation: It is ≤ 0 for type 0, and x ≤ ρ σ y is defined recursively by ∀u ρ (xu ≤ σ yu).
For convenience and clarity, the language L ω ≤ includes the primitive syntactic device of bounded quantifications, i.e. quantifications of the form ∀x ≤ * t and ∃x ≤ * t, for terms t not containing the variable x. Bounded formulas are those formulas in which every quantifier is bounded. The theory IL ω ≤ has also the following schematic axioms:
Definition 1. We define, by induction on the type, the functional m ρ of type ρ (ρ ρ) according to the following clauses:
It is well known that the combinators Π and Σ enjoy the property of combinatorial completeness whereby, given any term t with a distinguished variable u, there is a term λu.t whose free variables are those of t except for u, such that (λu.t)(q) is (in the sense of allowing the pertinent substitutions of one term for the other) t[q/u]. We are relying on the combinatorial completeness feature in the above definition.
We now adapt the notion of majorizability theory introduced in [5] to our present situation: 
An underlined term t stands for a (possibly empty) tuple of terms t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k . We use the underlined notation for tuples in several contexts. For instance, ∀x ≤ * t stands for the string ∀x 1 ≤ * t 1 ∀x 2 ≤ * t 2 . . . ∀x k ≤ * t k , where x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k and t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k are sequences of variables, respectively terms, with matching types. After a while, we will no longer underline terms. It will be clear from the context when we are referring to a tuple of terms, instead of a single term.
The new realizability notion
In this section, we define bounded modified realizability and prove corresponding soundness and characterization theorems.
The soundness theorem
In order to define the bounded modified realizability we need the following syntactic notion:
≤ is called∃-free if it is built from atomic formulas by means of conjunction, disjunction, implication, bounded quantifications and monotone universal quantifications, i.e., quantifications of the form∀a(. . .).
This notion reminds the well-known notion of ∃-free formula (cf. [16] ), but do observe that it allows disjunctions. We now proceed with the definition of the new realizability notion. We chose to define it in a slightly unfamiliar way. Instead of saying what are realizing tuples of functionals, we associate to each formula of the language an existential formula. One should see the existential tuples of this quantifier as the familiar places for the (purported) realizers of the given formula. br and A br of the same language so that (A) br is of the form∃bA br (b), with A br (b) a∃-free formula.
(A)
br and (A) br are simply A, for atomic formulas A.
If we have already interpretations for A and B given by∃bA br (b) and∃dB br (d) (respectively) then, we define
For bounded quantifiers we have:
And for unbounded quantifiers we define
Let us insist again and say that the tuples above may be empty. It also is understood, for instance, that (A → B) br is∀b(A br (b) → B br (f b)). Similarly for the other clauses. As usual, the case of negation is a particular case of the implication:
By inspection on the above clauses it is clear that, Lemma 4 (Monotonicity Lemma). Let (A(x)) br be∃bA br (b, x). The following monotonicity property holds:
Proposition 1. If A is a∃-free formula then (A) br is A br and they are equivalent to A.
Proof. The proof is by a straightforward induction on the complexity of the∃-free formula. Note that we cannot say that (A) br is exactly A becausẽ ∀aA(a) is syntactically an abbreviation of ∀a(a ≤ * a → A(a)) and hence, by definition, (∀aA(a))
. The latter formula is, of course, equivalent to∀aA br (a).
For simplicity, in the next corollary and in the Soundness Theorem, we adopt as definition of x ≤ * ρ σ y the formula∀v
. Note that this definition is given by a∃-free formula, and that (by (i) of Lemma 1) it is equivalent to the original one. With this proviso, the following is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1. Corollary 1. Given any type ρ, the formula (x ≤ * ρ y) br is (x ≤ * ρ y) br and they are equivalent to x ≤ * ρ y.
We state the Soundness Theorem in a strong form that already incorporates the principles which are automatically realized by the bounded modified realizability (vide the Characterization Theorem ahead). Two of these principles are related to similar principles that arise in the discussion of Kreisel's modified realizability (see [16] ). The third principle is characteristic of the bounded modified realizability.
I. The Bounded Choice Principle
where A is an arbitrary formula of the language L 
where A is a∃-free formula and B is an arbitrary formula. Even though we have stated bIP ρ ∃free for a single variable y only, the tuple version is an easy consequence of the principle as stated. We will generalize this principle to a wider class of formulas A in the end of this section.
III. The Majorizability Axioms
Note that in the presence of this principle, every universal (resp. existential) quantification is equivalent to a monotone universal (resp. existential) quantification followed by a bounded quantification. An application of this fact is that, in the presence of MAJ ω , we can allow plain universal quantifications in the definition of∃-free formulas.
We use bAC ω , bIP ω ∃free and MAJ ω , respectively, for the aggregate of each of the above principles over all types. Before we go on with the Soundness Theorem, it is worth observing that a vast generalization of Brouwer's FAN theorem follows from the above three principles.
where A is an arbitrary formula.
Observation 1.
In the context of analysis, Brouwer's theorem is the case ρ = 1, τ = 0. Note that the usual formulation of Brouwer's FAN theorem in, for instance, section 1.9.24 of [16] , differs from the statement above in that it concerns continuity, as opposed to majorizability. In Section 4, we will discuss some related principles already considered by Kohlenbach in [10] .
Observation 2. The case ρ = τ = 0 extends the familiar bounded collection principle of arithmetic.
Proof. We repeat an argument presented in [5] that also works in the present setting. Let c monotone be fixed. Assume that ∀z(z ≤ * c ρ → ∃y τ A(y, z)). By bIP ω ∃free we get ∀z∃b(z ≤ * c ρ → ∃y ≤ * bA(y, z)), which by bAC ω yields
In turn, by (ii) of Lemma 1, this implies
Taking a := c, we get∃b∀z ≤ * c∃y ≤ * bA(y, z). The main theorem of this paper is:
then there are closed monotone terms t of appropriate types such that
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation of A. For the sake of simplicity, we will not explicitly include the parameters z. The non-logical axioms are universal and, hence, are realized by the empty tuple. Let us consider the axioms for bounded quantifiers. We assume that each of the bounded principles B ∀ and B ∃ is a shorthand for two separate principles: the left-to-right and the right-to-left implications.
For the left-to-right implication we need to define monotone closed terms q such that
Of course, the terms q := λuv.u do the job. Concerning the right-to-left implication, we need monotone terms q such that
In this case define q := λu.ut wheret is a monotone majorant of t (whose existence is guaranteed in the majorizability theory T ω ). It is easy to see that the defined terms q are monotone and do the job.
For the left-to-right implication we need to define monotone terms q, s such that
Clearly the terms q := λu.t wheret is a monotone majorant of t (whose existence is guaranteed in the majorizability theory T ω ) and s := λu.u do the job. Concerning the reverse direction, we must define terms q such that
Just define q := λuv.v. For the logical axioms and rules assume that (A)
By induction hypothesis we have monotone terms t and q such that A br (t) and∀b(A br (b) → B br (qb)). Clearly s := q(t) is monotone and B br (s) holds.
2. A → B, B → C ⇒ A → C. By induction hypothesis we have monotone terms t and q such that∀b(
We need monotone terms t such that
By monotonicity (Lemmas 2 and 4), it is clear that the terms t := λuv.m(u, v) do the job.
By induction hypothesis we have monotone terms t such that∀b(A br (b) → B br (tb)). We must define monotone terms q and s such that
It is clear that q := λu, v.u and s := λu, v.v do the job.
Due to currying the terms that realize one of the formulas also realize the other.
8. ⊥→ A. Trivial. 9. A → B(z) ⇒ A → ∀zB(z). By induction hypothesis there are monotone terms t such that∀a∀z ≤ * a∀b(A br (b) → B br (tab, z)). Let q := λuv.tvu. Clearly q is monotone and realizes the conclusion.
10. ∀xA(x) → A(t). We must define monotone terms q such that
Lett be a monotone majorant of t (whose existence is guaranteed in the majorizability theory T ω ), and define q := λf .ft. These terms do the job. 11. A(t) → ∃xA(x). We need to define monotone closed terms q, r such that∀
Lett be a monotone majorant of t in the majorizability theory T ω (whose existence is guaranteed in the majorizability theory T ω ), and define q := λu.t and r := λv.v.
It is easy to see that the terms that realize the left-hand side also realize the right-hand side.
Finally, we need to check the principles bAC ω , bIP ω ∃free and MAJ ω : bAC ω . In order to realize bAC ω , an easy computation shows that it is enough to define monotone terms t and q such that,
Clearly the projections t := λf, g.f and q := λf, g.g do the job. bIP ω ∃free
. It is straightforward to see that one needs monotone terms t and q such that,
for A an ∃-free formula. The projections t := λu, v.u and q := λu, v.v do the job. MAJ ω . For each type ρ we need a monotone term t ρ ρ such that,
The identity functional t := λu ρ .u does the job.
The characterization theorem
There is a proof of the following result in [5] (in a slightly different setting):
where A is an arbitrary formula of the language
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the formula A. There is nothing to prove concerning atomic formulas. Suppose that IL 
Conspicuous logical forms
We study logical forms which are equivalent, imply or are implied by their own br associates (this parallels similar studies in ordinary realizability, e.g. in [16] ). Proposition 1 gives a special role to∃-free formulas. Let us define two superclasses of the class of∃-free formulas. ii. The class Γ br is closed under conjunctions, disjunctions, bounded quantifications, monotone universal quantifications and existential quantifications.
iii. The class Π br is closed under conjunctions, disjunctions, bounded quantifications and universal quantifications.
iv. If A is in Γ br and B is in Π br then (A → B) is in Π br and (B → A) is in Γ br .
Note that∃-free formulas are simultaneously in Γ br and Π br .
br . Moreover, in the latter case, (B) br is B br .
Proof. We prove the claims simultaneously, by induction on the complexity of formulas. The atomic case is clear, as well as conjunction, disjunction and existential bounded quantifications (since, modulo logical equivalence, these commute with the br -transformation). The cases of existential quantifications regarding the Γ br -class and of universal quantification regarding the Π br class pose no difficulty. Let us look at the monotone universal quantifier regarding the class Γ br . Suppose that A is∀aC(a), with C(a) in Γ br . , x) ). By induction hypothesis, this entails A.
It remains to study implication. Suppose that A is in Γ br and B is in Π br . By induction hypothesis, (A → B) br is∀b(A br (b) → B br ) and this is implied by A → B. On the other hand, (B → A) br is∃b(B br → A br (b)). By induction hypothesis, this implies B → A.
If one adds a principle of the form Π br to our theory, the above proposition shows that such a principle is trivially realized within a theory that includes it. Therefore, we have the following version of the Soundness Theorem: 
where ∆ is a collection of Π br sentences, then there are closed monotone terms t of appropriate types such that
The following is an immediate consequence of the above theorem and of Proposition 4: ) to (A) br . This latter formula has the form∃bA br (b), where A br (b) is a∃-free formula. Now, note that the class Γ br is closed under existential monotone quantifications. The proof that formulas in Π br are equivalent to∃-free formulas is by induction on the complexity of the formula. We only need to check the conditional clause. Suppose that A ∈ Γ br and B ∈ Π br . Since A is equivalent to∃bA br (b) if follows that A → B is intuitionistically equivalent to∀b(A(b) br → B). This formula is equivalent to a∃-free formula if B is. where A is in Π br , B is an arbitrary formula and y is of arbitrary type.
Note that negated formulas are in Π br modulo IL 
The role of some arithmetical principles
As an application of Theorem 3, we will discuss some arithmetical principles whose realizations follow from themselves. We must start our discussion by extending the general framework based on IL ω ≤ to arithmetic.
Theories of arithmetic
The arithmetical theories that concern us here are:
(n ≥ 2). The first one is an intuitionistic expansion of Gödel's quantifier-free calculus T with quantifiers ranging over each finite type. The theory PRA ω i differs from HA ω because it only has the "predicative" recursorsR σ due to Kleene (see [2] for a description of these recursors) and, correspondingly, induction in the following restricted form:
where A is a quantifier-free formula. It is known that the type 1 closed terms of the language of PRA ω i define the primitive recursive functions. The theories G n A ω i (n ≥ 2) were introduced by Kohlenbach (see [9] for details). They form a sequence of increasing strength, closely related to the levels of Grzegorczyk's hierarchy of primitive recursive functions. The principle of induction present is the restricted one above.
These theories must be set up within the general framework of Section 2. Accordingly, the treatment of equality in these theories is the minimal one due to Troelstra in [14] (note the treatment of the impredicative recursors). We define the usual less than or equal numerical relation ≤ 0 , and the usual term max 0 (0 0) , giving the maximum of two numbers. Under these theories, ≤ 0 is a reflexive and transitive relation and max satisfies the axioms A 1 and A 2 . It is clear that we may suppose that ≤ 0 and max are primitive symbols of the language, and may take 0 as the distinguished constant of type zero.
For the sake of completeness, we must say that all the above theories of arithmetic include: (a) a minimization functional µ b of type (0 1) 1 such that µ b f 0 1 n 0 = 0 min 0 k ≤ 0 n(f nk = 0 0) if such a k ≤ 0 n exists, and = 0 0 otherwise; and (b) a maximization functional M of type 1 1 satisfying the equations M f 0 = 0 f 0 and M f (n + 1) = 0 max 0 (M f n, f (n + 1)). We usually write f M instead of M f . Note that f ≤ * 1 f M . The following result is due to Howard [7] for HA ω , and to Kohlenbach [9] for the other theories: 
where ∆ is a collection of Π br sentences, then there are closed monotone terms t of appropriate types of the language of T ω such that
Proof. It is enough to see that the arithmetical axioms are realized in T ω . This is clearly the case for the arithmetical axioms that are universal statements, as well as for the quantifier-free induction axioms of the theories PRA ω i and G n A ω i (n ≥ 2). It remains to see that the scheme of unrestricted induction
can be interpreted in HA
ω . An easy computation shows that one must present a monotone functionals t such that
Using the recursors of Gödel's T we define t such that taΦ0 is a and taΦ(n+1) is max(Φ(taΦn)n, taΦn). This functional clearly does the job.
The theory G 2 A ω +bAC ω +bIP ω ∃free +MAJ ω refutes Markov's principle and, therefore, it is classically inconsistent. In effect, suppose that
By intuitionistic logic and bIP ω ∃free , ∀x 1 ∃n 0 (¬∀k 0 (xk = 0) → ∃i ≤ n(xi = 0)). By the bounded collection principle, one infers that there is a natural number l 0 such that ∀x ≤ 1 1(¬∀k 0 (xk = 0) → ∃n ≤ l(xn = 0)). This is a contradiction (just consider the number theoretic function that takes the value 1 for values less than or equal to l and is 0 afterwards).
Nevertheless, the theory
. This is a corollary of the Soundness Theorem:
This corollary has an interesting interpretation (we are grateful to Reinhard Kahle for pointing this out to us). It can be viewed as the realization of a non-standard Hilbert program (pace the intuitionistic setting) for the "ideal" (and rather strange) world of
It is a consequence of the next corollary that this "ideal" world is even Π 0 2 -conservative over the "real" world.
Corollary 5. Under the conditions of Theorem 4, if
where ρ ∈ {0, 1}, τ is arbitrary, A is in Γ br and the variables are as displayed, then there is a closed monotone term t ρ τ of the language of T ω such that
Proof. Clearly, (∃y τ A(x, y)) br is∃a τ , b∃y ≤ * τ a A br (b, x, y). Therefore, by Theorem 4, there are closed monotone terms t and q such that the theory T ω + ∆ proves ∃y ≤ * τ tx M A br (qx M , x, y) (the case ρ = 0 is even simpler). The result follows from Proposition 4.
As it is well-known, when ρ = τ = 0, the functional t is of type 1 and corresponds to an < 0 -recursive function (respectively, primitive recursive, function in the n-level of the Grzegorczyk's hierarchy) when T ω is HA ω (respectively, PRA ω i , G n A ω i with n ≥ 2). The following result is an adaptation of a result of Kohlenbach in [10] .
Corollary 6. Under the conditions of Theorem 4, if t is a closed term of the language, C is in Π br , D is in Γ br and
with the free variables as displayed, then there is a closed monotone term Ψ of the language of T ω such that
) is a consequence of the major theory above, wheret is a closed term such that t ≤ * t (see Proposition 6). By bIP ω Π br and bBC ω , we conclude that D(w) ). Since the formula that follows the quantifier ∃a 2 is in Γ br , by the previous corollary there is a closed monotone term r 1 2 such that
By a simple computation and (iii) of Lemma 1, we get the desired result.
About certain principles (Part I)
Principles that have the form Π br (those which may occur in ∆ above) are very convenient because they are self-realizable. However, principles that follow from the theory T ω + bAC ω + bIP ω ∃free + MAJ ω are even better since they are not necessary for the verification of their own realizability. As a consequence, even if they are false principles certain truthful bounding information can be obtained from their use because they are not needed for the verification of the bounds. (In this paper, talk about 'true' and 'false' refers to the full set-theoretic structure associated with the language of arithmetic in all finite types, where the zero type ranges over the natural numbers.) This is the case with certain versions of the FAN theorem, under the heading of uniform boundedness principles (these were so baptized and studied by Kohlenbach in, e.g., [9] and [10] ). Before we look at them, let us first briefly consider some forms of choice since, in general, choice principles do not come for free within the framework of the bounded modified realizability (contrary to Kohlenbach's monotone modified realizability).
It is an easy consequence of bAC ω that ∀x ρ ∃yA(x, y) →∃f ∀x∃y ≤ * f x A(x, y)
for ρ ∈ {0, 1}, y of any type and A arbitrary. A simple trick shows that when the type of y is 0, 1 or 2 then the inequality y ≤ * f x may be replaced by y ≤ f x. Remark further that if A is quantifier-free and y is of type 0 then we can obtain the usual form of choice using a bounded search. In the next section we will say more about the usual form of choice.
Kohlenbach's principle of uniform boundedness UB ρ for the type ρ is the following combination of the FAN theorem with choice:
for arbitrary A.
Proposition 7. Let ρ be a given type. The principle of uniform boundedness UB ρ is provable in
Proof. Fix y 0 ρ and assume that ∀k 0 ∀x ≤ ρ yk ∃z 0 A(x, y, k, z).
We can apply bIP ω Π br (see Corollary 3) and move the existential quantifier ∃z 0 to the front of the implication. Using bBC ω and the arbitrariness of k we get ∀k
. By a form of choice discussed above and (iii) of Lemma 1, we get the desired conclusion. This is perhaps a good place to say a few words concerning bounded realizability vis-à-vis Kohlenbach's monotone realizability. Kohlenbach's interpretation (cf. [10] ) relies upon the transformation of formulas of Kreisel's modified realizability, differing from it in the statement of the soundness theorem. Let (A) mr and A mr denote the formulas assigned to a given formula A by the modified realizability interpretation of Kreisel (here (A) mr is of the form ∃xA mr (x), with A mr (x) a ∃-free formula). The soundness theorem for monotone realizability guarantees the existence of monotone closed terms t such that
whenever the theory T ω + AC ω + IP ω ∃free proves A(z). The principles AC ω and IP ω ∃free are (respectively) the axiom of choice for arbitrary matrices and the independence of premises principle for ∃-free antecendents (types are not restricted). The advantage of monotone realizability over Kreisel's realizability is due to the fact that a soundness theorem still holds good when one adjoins to the theory T ω certain ineffective principles (see Theorem 3.10 of [10] for details).
The most conspicuous difference between monotone realizability and bounded realizability is the fact that the first is based on a transformation of formulas which is classically correct whereas the second is not. Due to this correctness, monotone realizability is able to extract classically correct bounds from consequences of the form ∀∃F , where F is an arbitrary matrix. These bounds can be obtained in the presence of certain classically correct ineffective principles and are obtained within a formal framework where FAN-like rules (with arbitrary matrix) are admissible. On the other hand, the classically incorrect transformation of formulas upon which bounded realizability is based hinders the extraction of classically correct bounds from arbitrary ∀∃ consequences. However, bounded realizability is specially taylored for obtaining new conservation results (see Corollary 5 above) regarding certain special kinds of sentences (of the form ∀∃, followed by a Γ br matrix) and, also, for extracting classically correct bounds for consequences of this kind. These results can be obtained in the presence of very general FAN-like principles (as opposed to rules), many of which false, and also of certain ineffective principles (see the next section).
About certain principles (Part II)
We present a list of principles which follow from
with the aid of true assertions that have the form Π br (over the base theory T ω ). According to Theorem 4 and related results, the bounds resulting from the application of these results to the principles are truthful, i.e., can be verified in a true theory. We call such principles benign. Note that benign principles can be false! 1. Extensional equality in higher types is defined by induction on the type. For type 0, it is the given equality at type 0. The equality x = ρ τ y is defined by ∀u ρ (xu = τ yu). Full extensionality is the collection of axioms of the form ∀φ ρ τ ∀x ρ , y ρ (x = ρ y → φx = τ φy). The scheme of full extensionality does not seem to be self-realizable because of the relativization to majorizable functionals in bounded modified realizability. However, the axioms of extensionality for types ρ = 0, 1, 2 can easily be put in the form Π br . Hence, these forms of extensionality are benign.
2. The classical, but not intuitionistic, truth
where A and B are Π br -formulas modulo T ω + bAC ω + bIP ω ∃free + MAJ ω , and the types of x and y are unrestricted, is benign. Note that when both types are 0 and A and B are quantifier-free formulas, we have the well-known lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO (cf. [4] ). Also, by the argument after Corollary 3, it follows from ( §) that the scheme ∀x∀y(¬A(x) ∨ ¬B(y)) → ∀x¬A(x) ∨ ∀y¬B(y), where A and B are arbitrary, is benign. In order to see that ( §) is benign, observe that this principle follows (over
where A and B are∃-free formulas (use Proposition 5). Since this restricted implication is in Π br and it is true, we are done.
3. The law of excluded middle A ∨ ¬A, for A ∈ Π br , is benign because (over T ω + bAC ω + bIP ω ∃free + MAJ ω ) it follows from the Π br -scheme A ∨ ¬A, with A in the class of∃-free formulas. Note that this form of excluded middle includes Π 0 1 − LEM, i.e., ∀n 0 A 0 (n) ∨ ¬∀n 0 A 0 (n) for A 0 a first-order bounded formula. In view of the fact that T ω +bAC ω +bIP ω ∃free +MAJ ω refutes Markov's principle, one is drawn to the conclusion that Π 0 1 − LEM does not prove Markov's principle. This result first appeared in [1] .
As in the discussion of the previous point, by the argument following Corollary 3, we get that the scheme ¬A∨¬¬A is benign, where A is arbitrary.
4. The following principle can easily be put in Π br -form:
whereĥ is the functional of type 1 → ρ defined byĥ := λx 1 .hx M , and A is a∃-free formula. This is clearly a true principle. Note that a tuple of h's would also be alright. The choice principle AC 1,ρ is
where A is an arbitrary formula. We show that this choice principle is provable in T ω + bAC ω + bIP ω ∃free + MAJ ω together with the tuple version of the above Π br -principle. As a consequence, AC 1,ρ is benign (AC 0,ρ is also benign). Suppose that ∀x 1 ∃y ρ A(x, y). By the Characterization Theorem 2, we deduce that ∀x 1 ∃y ρ∃ bA br (b, x, y). By bAC ω there are monotone functionals h 1 ρ and φ such that
We deduce ∃f ≤ * 1 ρĥ ∃ψ ≤ * φ ∀x 1 (ψx ≤ * ψx ∧ A br (ψx, x, f x)) by the tuple version of ($). Hence,
A new application of the Characterization Theorem yields the result.
5. The discussion above does not generalize to choice principles in which x is of type greater than 1 because, for such types, ($) cannot be put in the form Π br . However, there is a benign version of choice with no restrictions on the types: 
This conditional is of∃-form and it is true. From it, by Modus Ponens, it follows that ∃f τ ρ ∀x ≤ * τ a∃b A br (b, x, f x). Again by the Characterization Theorem, we get ∃f τ ρ ∀x ≤ * τ a A(x, f x). 6. It is well known that the FAN theorem is true (and intuitionistically acceptable) for quantifier-free matrices without parameters of type greater than 1. A modification of its contrapositive, which is equivalent to weak König's lemma WKL, is rejected intuitionistically. Nevertheless, it is clear that this modified contrapositive:
can be put in the form Π br when A is a quantifier-free formula. Therefore, it is a benign principle. A related principle is uniform weak König's lemma (first considered in [11] ), UWKL for short:
where we are using the notation of [2] . Remark that the functional Φ 
for A a Π br -formula, are benign. They follow (over T ω + bAC ω + bIP ω ∃free + MAJ ω ) from their restrictions to formulas A that are∃-free (use Proposition 5). These restrictions are true and have the form Π br . By previous discussions, it is clear that comprehension CA ρ ¬ for negated formulas is also a benign principle:
∃Φ ≤ * ρ 0 λx ρ .1 0 ∀y ρ (Φy = 0 0 ↔ ¬A(y)).
8. By a similar argument, the scheme of induction A(0) ∧ ∀n(A(n) → A(n + 1)) → ∀nA(n),
is benign for A a Π br -formula or a negated formula. 9. In [10] , Kohlenbach considered the principles F ρ :
∀Φ 0 (ρ 0) ∀y 0 ρ ∃y 0 ≤ 0 ρ y ∀k 0 ∀z ≤ ρ yk (Φkz ≤ 0 Φk(y 0 k)).
These principles are false for ρ = 0. They are, nevertheless, benign. We make some preliminary remarks. Let (x ≤ ρ y) M be the formula obtained from x ≤ ρ y by substituting every universal quantifier ∀u by the complex ∀v∀u ≤ * v. The new relation (x ≤ ρ y) M is the old relation x ≤ ρ y relativized to the class of M := {u :∃v(u ≤ * v)} of majorizable functionals. Consider:
This principle is true and has the form Π br . We argue that over the theory T ω + bAC ω + bIP ω ∃free + MAJ ω the principle ( ) and AC 0,ρ entails F ρ . This shows that F ρ is benign.
Due to the presence of MAJ ω , the formulas x ≤ ρ y and (x ≤ ρ y) M are equivalent. We will use this fact systematically. Take Φ 0 (ρ 0) and y 0 ρ . Let k 0 be given. Put Ψ := Φk and u := yk. LetΨ and v be such that Ψ ≤ * ρ 0Ψ and u ≤ * ρ v. For z ≤ * ρ v we get Ψz ≤ 0Ψ v. In particular, ∀z ≤ * ρ v(z ≤ ρ u → Ψz ≤ 0 n), where n isΨv. By ( ) and (iii) of Lemma 1, ∃x 0 (x 0 ≤ ρ u ∧ ∀z(z ≤ ρ u → Ψz ≤ 0 Ψx 0 )). By the arbitrariness of k 0 we have ∀k 0 ∃x 0 (x 0 ≤ ρ yk ∧ ∀z(z ≤ ρ yk → Φkz ≤ 0 Φkx 0 )).
An application of AC 0,ρ yields F ρ .
Closing
For some years now, Ulrich Kohlenbach and his students have been showing the practical use of Proof Theory in obtaining numerical bounds from classical proofs of analysis (see [12] for a recent survey). Kohlenbach's methods are not based on realizability because realizability notions (including bounded realizability) are not taylored for the analysis of classical proofs. In effect, even though a classical proof can be translated into an intuitionistic proof via (e.g.) the Gödel-Gentzen negative translation, the translation destroys existential statements -replacing them by negated universal statementswith the consequence that realizers yield no computational information. Of course, this shortcoming is related with the fact that Markov's principle is not benign. That notwithstanding, bounded modified realizability (and monotone modified realizability [10] ) supports many classical principles that go beyond intuitionistic logic (see Subsections 4.2 and 4.3).
In order to deal with full classical reasoning, one must use the more sophisticated tool of the functional interpretation, introduced by Kurt Gödel in [6] (one should add, for quite different reasons -see the discussion in [14] ). Contrary to realizability, Gödel's interpretation is efficient in analyzing classical proofs because it supports Markov's principle. The proof-theoretical tool used by Ulrich Kohlenbach in his program of searching for numerical information in classical proofs of analysis (so-called Proof Mining) is a modification of Gödel's interpretation, still based on Gödel's assignment of formulas: monotone functional interpretation. As we have said in the introduction, the realizability notion studied in this paper stems from work on a newly found functional interpretation, based on a novel assignment of formulas: bounded functional interpretation. The new functional interpretation supports (a variation of) Markov's principle, being also efficient for the analysis of classical proofs. Moreover, it has the peculiarity of using intensional majorizability relations (i.e., regulated by rules, instead of axioms). The curious reader can learn about the new interpretation in [5] .
